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Abstract
Inequity aversion is a special form of other regarding preferences and captures many
features of reciprocal behavior, an apparently robust pattern in human nature. Using
this concept we analyze the Moral Hazard problem and derive several results which
diﬀer from conventional contract theory. Our three key insights are: First, inequity
aversion plays a crucial role in the design of optimal contracts. Second, there is a
strong tendency towards linear sharing rules, giving a simple and plausible rationale
for the prevalence of these schemes in the real world. Third, the Suﬃcient Statistics
result no longer holds as optimal contracts may be ”too” complete. Along with these
key insights we derive a couple of further results, e.g. that the First Best contract
for risk neutral agents is unique or that for risk neutral agents the First Best is not
implementable if eﬀort is not observable.Contracts and Inequity Aversion 2
1 Introduction
It is when equals have or are assigned unequal shares, or people who are
not equal, equal shares, that quarrels and complaints break out.
Aristotle
Inequity aversion is a special form of other regarding preferences. Capturing many
features of reciprocal behavior, an apparently robust pattern in human nature, it was
formulated by Ernst Fehr und Klaus Schmidt (1999) only recently1. The approach
adheres rather closely to orthodox utility theory but is well capable of explaining a
wide array of phenomena.
Inequity averse people do not only care about their own payoﬀ, but also about
how payoﬀs are distributed amongst their mates. Inequitable distributions cause them
disutility. This disutility from inequitable distributions may outweigh the utility crea-
ted by personal payoﬀs. So people would rather forego proﬁts than accept inequitable
distributions. This is a very stable pattern in many empirical and experimental stu-
dies. One example is the well known ultimatum game, where the ”responders” usually
turn down ”unfair” oﬀers, although these oﬀers would still assign them an appreciable
amount of money.2
Reciprocal patterns and notions of fairness seem to play an important role in
human interactions and especially in labour markets, where people work together
closely and earn their income.3 However, so far nobody has investigated to what
extent the incentive structure of labor contracts has to adopt to the prevalence of
norms of reciprocity. In this paper we tackle the standard moral hazard problem and
1However, inequity aversion is not really a new concept. In the 1960’s it was already discussed
by sociologists. See e.g. Gouldner (1960), Goranson and Berkowitz (1966) or Berkowitz (1968). For
a discussion of previous attempts to model concerns for equity in the economics literature refer to
Austin (1977), Selten (1978), Young (1994) or Selten (1998).
2See Fehr, Gaechter and Kirchsteiger (1997) for reference on ultimatum game studies and Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) for a survey of experimental and empirical studies
3See for example Akerlof(1982), Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and Fehr and Falk (1999).Contracts and Inequity Aversion 3
introduce inequity averse agents.4 From that several new results, shedding light on
some well known puzzles in standard contract theory, are derived. First it is shown
that the First Best contract for risk neutral agents is unique. The second result
says that for risk neutral agents the First Best is not implementable if eﬀort is not
observable. The third point we make is that the Suﬃcient Statistics result does no
longer hold. Finally it is proven that the optimal contract is linear in the First Best
under risk neutrality and in the Second Best in the limit of strong inequity aversion.
These results are partly in contradiction to orthodox theory.
In the real world we often observe linear contracts. Examples range from the
persistence of sharecropping to the compensation schemes used by most start up
businesses, where it is very common to pay the employees a rather low ﬁxed wage
but to give them in turn a share of the company’s equity.
While standard economic theory predicts a much more complex and - from a
practical point of view - generally undetermined structure to be the optimal solution
to the principal agent problem (see e.g. Holmstr¨ om (1979) or Mirrlees (1999)) there
are only few attempts to explain the occurrence of linear contracts. Holmstr¨ om and
Milgrom (1987) consider a setting where the agent controls the drift rate of a Brow-
nian motion. They show that the optimal contract is - for a rather speciﬁc setting -
linear in overall outcome. However, the Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom result depends very
delicately on the assumptions they make on the stochastic process and on the form
of the utility function.5
Innes (1990) assumes instead that the agent is risk neutral but wealth constrained.
Then the optimal contract makes the agent the residual claimant if the outcome is
such that it exceeds his wealth. In those regions the contract takes a linear form.
This implies that the optimal contract has a slope of one, something which we rarely
observe.
4There are some other problems, too, that have been approached by using inequity aversion.
There have been attempts to explain ﬁnancial bubbles in an inequity aversion framework (Gebhardt
(2001)). Also it has been shown that inequity aversion in an adverse selection set up can explain
wage compression (von Siemens (2001)).
5See Hellwig and Schmidt (2000) for a detailed discussion.Contracts and Inequity Aversion 4
There are a few studies that show that sharecropping contracts, perhaps the most
widespread form of incentive contracts, are not only linear, but have predominantly a
slope of 1/2. Bardhan and Rudra (1980), Bardhan (1984), Young (1996) and Young
and Burke (2001) report empirical studies from India and Illinois where 60% to 90%
of sharecropping contracts stipulate the equal split.
We use inequity aversion to explain these stylized facts. A linear and equitable
sharing rule avoids the problem that in some situations one party is well-oﬀ, while the
other earns little. For standard utility maximizers this is not a problem, as expected
utility is all that counts. However, under inequity aversion an inequitable distribution
of surplus reduces the agent’s utility. So redistribution until an equitable outcome is
achieved increases social beneﬁt. If the surplus in diﬀerent states of the world is not
divided equitably the agent suﬀers from being better oﬀ or worse oﬀ respectively.
Therefore inequity aversion adds a driving force towards linear and equitable sharing
rules.
Using a model with convex costs of inequity aversion, we show that the First Best
contract for risk neutral agents is, in contrast to standard contract theory, unique and
linear with slope 1/2. This contract minimizes the principal’s cost as it minimizes in-
equity, as every marginal unit is split equitably. But as soon as eﬀort is no longer
observable the First Best is, even for risk neutral agents, not implementable. This
result is due to the fact that while the agent is risk neutral with respect to his mo-
netary payoﬀ we induce risk-averse-like preferences by introducing convex disutility
of inequitable outcomes. In the Second Best the slope of the wage scheme is strictly
above 1/2 as there is a need to give proper incentives. The strongest incentives are
given if the ﬁrm is sold to the agent, i.e. the slope of the wage scheme is 1. But as
this would result in very inequitable distributions of wealth, this is not optimal. It is
cheaper for the principal to have lower incentives and lower exerted eﬀort, but not
to be forced to pay a high compensation to the agent in order to make up for the
expected inequity. The stronger the concern for equitable distributions becomes the
more the contract tends to the linear sharing rule. In the limit of inﬁnite inequity
aversion the concern for equity dominates any other aspect of the problem and theContracts and Inequity Aversion 5
unique solution is a linear contract with slope 1/2.
Allowing for risk aversion introduces a countervailing force. While inequity aver-
sion pushes towards equitable sharing, i.e. a slope of 1/2, risk aversion demands ﬂat
wage schemes, i.e. a slope of 0. Therefore, in the First Best without an incentive
problem, the slope of the scheme is strictly below 1/2, but, again, tends more to the
equitable split the more inequity averse the agent becomes. The intuition again is
straightforward. In the First Best under risk neutrality the slope of the wage scheme
was 1/2. Now the presence of risk aversion without a need for proper incentives calls
for a less risky wage scheme.
Turning to the Second Best with risk averse agents leaves us with a shortage of
clear-cut results. In this case there are three forces: inequity aversion, risk aversion
and the need for incentives, working in opposing directions. While inequity aversion
calls for a slope of 1/2, risk aversion pushes towards a slope of 0 and incentives are
maximal at a slope of 1. Therefore the only stable eﬀect is that the wage scheme is
strictly increasing in proﬁt. And again it holds true that the more inequity averse the
agents become the stronger is the tendency towards the equitable sharing rule.
The last main result concerns the well known Suﬃcient Statistics result. This
standard result says that a contract should condition on a speciﬁc variable if and only
if it is a suﬃcient statistic for eﬀort choice. This does not hold if agents are inequity
averse. As agents have a concern for the distribution of payoﬀs the optimal contract
conditions also on those parts of the proﬁt which do not contain any information
about the agent’s eﬀort choice.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 the basic results for the case of
risk neutral agents are derived. Section 3 discusses the general case of risk aversion,
where we concentrate on the limit case of extreme inequity aversion. In Section 4 it
is shown that the Suﬃcient Statistics result no longer holds. Section 5 concludes the
paper.Contracts and Inequity Aversion 6
2 Inequity Averse Agent
We model the interaction between a risk neutral proﬁt maximizing principal and a
utility maximizing agent who exhibits inequity aversion. To illustrate the problem,
consider a landlord and a tenant.
The landlord, who is the principal in the model, is assumed throughout to be selﬁsh
and risk neutral while the tenant, i.e. the agent, is inequity averse6. The landlord hires
the tenant to cultivate his ﬁelds. The crop x at the end of the season is distributed
in an interval [x, ¯ x] with density f(x | e) which is determined by the eﬀort e exerted
by the tenant. As the principal is neither risk averse nor inequity averse he wants to
maximize his expected net proﬁt
EUP =
¯ x R
x
f(x | e)[(x − w(x)]dx
where w(x) is the wage paid to the agent.
The agent’s utility function exhibits risk neutrality in wealth and inequity aver-
sion. To decide whether an allocation is fair or unfair the agent compares her payoﬀ
w(x) and the principal’s net payoﬀ [x − w(x)]7. Therefore the agent’s utility is given
by
UA = w(x) − c(e) − αG[[x − w(x)] − w(x)]
with ξG0(ξ) > 0 , G
00(ξ) > 0
G(0) = 0 , G
0(0) = 0 , G
00(0) = 0
The function G(·) captures the fact that the agent suﬀers from inequitable outcomes.
Whenever the share of the principal, x − w(x) and her own share, w(x), diﬀer, this
causes disutility, which is assumed to be convex8. α is the weight the agent puts on
6One could extend the model and allow for an inequity averse principal, too. Section 5 contains
a discussion of this topic.
7All our results hold for a richer model, too, where the agent compares her net payoﬀ [w(x)−c(e)]
to the principal’s net payoﬀ [x−w(x)]. But in order to keep the exposition as simple as possible we
present only this version.
8Dropping the assumption of convexity does no harm to our main results, but for simplicity -
and as we think it is realistic - we keep it throughout the paper.Contracts and Inequity Aversion 7
achieving equitable outcomes. One could think of this weight embedded in G, but as
limit results are derived in Section 3 it is written explicitely. As eﬀort can be easily
redeﬁned there are no restrictions imposed on c(e) apart from c0(e) > 0.
The way inequity aversion is modelled is very similar to Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
However we diﬀer in one important aspect. The Fehr and Schmidt function for the
two player case has the following form:
Ui(xi) = xi − αi max{xj − xi,0} − βi max{xi − xj,0}
While utility in our model is also additively separable in income, eﬀort and inequi-
table outcomes the way to describe the disutility caused by inequitable outcomes is
altered. We assume that the disutility from inequality is convex. There are two reasons
for this. The ﬁrst reason is technical. Disutility from inequity is another deadweight
loss, next to costs from bearing risk, and usually convex cost functions are assumed
in order to guarantee interior solutions. The second reason is economical: Convexity
implies an aversion towards lotteries over diﬀerent levels of inequity, while concavity
would imply aﬃnity towards such lotteries. Assuming risk averse agents later on in
this paper one should not have such features of risk loving built in the model.
In the ﬁrst best case where one can write contracts on eﬀort levels e the principal
faces the following optimization problem
max
e,w(x)
EUP =
¯ x Z
x
f(x | e)[(x − w(x)]dx
s.t.(PC) EUA =
¯ x Z
x
f(x | e){w(x) − αG[x − 2w(x)]}dx − c(e) ≥ ¯ U
where PC denotes the agent’s participation constraint.
In the standard case without inequity aversion this problem has multiple solutions.
The principal chooses the optimal eﬀort level while the wage scheme can take any
given form as both agent and principal only care about expected wage. This is diﬀerent
in the case with an inequity averse agent. Proposition 1 below shows that the optimal
contract is unique and linear.9
9The exact structure is given by w(x) = λ−1
4αλ + 1/2 x, i.e. a constant plus an equitable share of
the proﬁt. λ denotes the Lagrange parameter.Contracts and Inequity Aversion 8
Proposition 1
If both agent and principal are risk neutral and the agent exhibits inequity
aversion, the First Best contract is unique and linear with slope 1/2.10
The intuition for this result is obvious. The principal wants to hold the agent down
to her outside option and to extract as much rent as possible. Due to the convexity
of G the costs from inequitable outcomes are minimized by holding the extent of
inequity in every possible state of the world constant. But this implies that principal
and agent have to share the surplus equally in every state of the world. Therefore
the optimal contract is given by a ﬁxed payment not depending on the realized proﬁt
level while every additional unit of surplus is divided equally between the two.
Note that in contrast to the standard principal agent literature, which focuses on
the incentive constraint as the reason for contingent contracts, here it is the parti-
cipation constraint, which causes a contract to depend on the outcome in a linear
form.
A straightforward generalization of Proposition 1 yields:
Corollary
For m risk neutral principals and n risk neutral and inequity averse agents
the slope of the First Best incentive scheme is 1/(m + n).
Still keeping our agent risk neutral we now turn to the second best where the
contract cannot condition upon e. This gives an additional constraint in the principal’s
optimization problem
(IC) e ∈ argmax
e EUA =
¯ x R
x
f(x | e){w(x) − αG[(x − 2w(x)]}dx − c(e)
where IC denotes the agent’s incentive constraint. As usual in the literature we use
the ﬁrst order approach to derive our results.
In standard principal agent models the First Best is still implementable even if
eﬀort is not observable as long as the agent is risk neutral. The principal just sells
10The proofs for this and all other propositions can be found in the appendix of this paper.Contracts and Inequity Aversion 9
the ﬁrm to the agent. Now the agent has full marginal incentives and - because of
risk neutrality - no disutility from bearing risk.
This no longer works under the presence of inequity aversion, as selling the ﬁrm
results in almost all cases in very inequitable allocations.
Proposition 2
In the Second Best case where both agent and principal are risk neutral
and the agent is inequity averse, the First Best is not implementable.
To see this recall that the First Best contract is unique and has slope 1/2. As
one wants to give full incentives, i.e. slope 1, in the Second Best the First Best
outcome cannot be achieved. The intuition is quite straightforward. The convexity
of the disutility from inequitable outcomes induces risk-averse-like preferences and
therefore the First Best is no longer feasible .
In general, only the following statement on the optimal wage scheme can be made:
Lemma 1
In the Second Best case where both agent and principal are risk neutral
and the agent exhibits inequity aversion, the slope of the optimal contract
is strictly greater than 1/2 if the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property
(MLRP)11 holds.
The reason for this result is as follows. In the First Best case, without any need to
give proper incentives, the slope already was 1/2. Now, as the need for incentives is
present and a higher value of x is, due to the MLRP, a signal for a higher eﬀort level,
one should observe higher powered incentive schemes. The reason why one in general
will not observe a slope of one is that one has to balance oﬀ the need to provide
incentives and the increasing disutility from inequity.
A close look at the slope of w(x), w0(x) = 1
2 + 1
4α
µ ∂
∂x[
fe(x|e)
f(x|e) ]
[λ+µ
fe(x|e)
f(x|e) ]
2
G00(·)
, shows that
if the agent’s concern for inequity, i.e. α, increases, the contract converges to the
equal sharing rule as the relative weight on the ﬁrst term increases compared to the
11The MLRP says that the ratio
fe(x|e)
f(x|e) has to be strictly increasing in x.Contracts and Inequity Aversion 10
weight of the second term, 1
4α. If the agent is extremely inequity averse the contract
is virtually linear.
3 Risk Averse Agent
Introducing risk aversion alters the agent’s utility function to
EUA =
¯ x R
x
f(x | e)uA[w(x)] − αG[x − 2w(x)]dx − c(e)
with u0
A[w(x)] > 0 and u00
A[w(x)] < 0. I.e. the agent’s utility is concave in his monetary
payoﬀ. This implies that he dislikes gambles over his wealth. We still assume that
utility is still additively separable in a term depending on monetary payoﬀs, uA[w(x)],
and the part that captures his aversion towards inequitable outcomes, G(·).
For the First Best case the principal’s optimization problem has following form
max
w(x)
EUP =
¯ x R
x
f(x | e)[x − w(x)]dx
s.t. (PC) EUA =
¯ x R
x
f(x | e){uA[w(x)] − αG[x − 2w(x)]}dx − c(e) ≥ ¯ U
Now there is a tradeoﬀ between the agent’s risk aversion, which pushes towards a
ﬁxed wage payment, and her inequity aversion, which pushes towards the equal split.
We formulate this in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2
In the First Best case where the agent is risk averse and has convex di-
sutility from inequity, the slope of the optimal contract is strictly below
1/2.
The intuition again is straightforward. As in the First Best case under risk neutra-
lity the slope of the wage scheme was 1/2, now the presence of risk aversion without
a need for proper incentives calls for a less risky wage scheme.
Again, looking at w0(x) = 1
2 +
u00
A[w(x)]
α8G00(·)−2u00
A[w(x)] shows that for an increasing α, i.e.
more inequity averse agents, the contract converges to the equitable sharing rule, as
the latter part becomes smaller and smaller as α increases.Contracts and Inequity Aversion 11
Now analyzing the second best case one has to add another constraint:
(IC) e ∈ argmax
e EUA =
¯ x R
x
f(x | e){uA[w(x)] − αG[(x − 2w(x)]}dx − c(e)
Out of the above stated optimization problem one gets, by using the ﬁrst order
approach, the following ﬁrst order conditions.
∂uA[w(x)]
∂w(x)
=
1
λ + µ
fe(x|e)
f(x|e)
− 2αG
0(·)
From this we derive Lemma 3, which replicates a standard result from conventional
contract theory.
Lemma 3
The optimal Second Best contract for a risk and inequity averse agent is
strictly increasing in x if the MLRP holds.
This result is not surprising. The result in standard contract theory is that the
optimal contract is increasing in x if the MLRP holds. Now inequity aversion is added
which is an additional force towards proﬁt oriented payment schemes.12
For the general case, i.e. α 6= 0, the slope of the wage scheme is given by
w
0(x) =
1
2
+
1
2u00
A[w(x)] +
"
µ ∂
∂x[
fe(x|e)
f(x|e) ]
[λ+µ
fe(x|e)
f(x|e) ]
2
#
α4G00(·) − u00
A[w(x)]
Now consider the case of extreme inequity aversion, i.e. α → ∞. This would
describe a person suﬀering so much from inequity that she could not be compensated
for. She would be willing to incur enormous costs in order to achieve an equitable
allocation.13
12Note, that, assuming α = 0, i.e. a non inequity averse agent, the First Order Condition boils
down to the well known expression 1
∂uA[w(x)]
∂w(x)
= λ + µ
fe(x|e)
f(x|e) where the curvature of the incentive
scheme is determined by the likelihood ratio.
13One might think of Heinrich von Kleist’s novel Michael Kohlhaas, where the Saxon horse dealer
Kohlhaas triggered oﬀ a war when he was betrayed by the authorities, i.e. an inequitable outcome
was imposed on him.Contracts and Inequity Aversion 12
Proposition 3
If the agent is inﬁnitely inequity averse the optimal Second Best contract
is linear with slope 1/2.
There is no longer any scope for the principal to successfully propose a scheme that
deviates from the equitable split as any deviation would harm the agent inﬁnitely.
One can see this fairly easy in the condition for the slope of the optimal contract, as
the latter term converges to zero if α becomes very large.
4 The Suﬃcient Statistics Result
In this section it is shown that one of the basic concepts of contract theory no longer
holds if agents are inequity averse. The agent’s concern for equitable outcomes calls for
a proﬁt contingent contract even in the case where proﬁt is not a suﬃcient statistic14
for the eﬀort choice. This fact is captured in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4
If the agent is inequity averse the suﬃcient statistics result does not apply.
To prove this consider the following setup: The ﬁrms’ proﬁt Π can be separated
into two parts x and y, i.e. Π = x+y. While the distribution of x depends on the eﬀort
e exerted by the agent, y is purely randomly distributed. In the appendix it is shown
that contrary to the well known suﬃcient statistics result, the optimal contract when
the agent exhibits inequity aversion conditions on y, although this variable contains
no information concerning the eﬀort choice.
The intuition should be clear. Proﬁt serves not only as a signal whether or not
the agent exerted enough eﬀort, but also is important for the agent’s utility as she
has a concern for equitable distributions. As the agent compares her payoﬀ to the
ﬁrm’s proﬁt, y is taken into account when equitability is judged. Therefore it has to
be taken into account when the contract is written.
14See Holmstr¨ om (1979) for a formal exposition.Contracts and Inequity Aversion 13
A recent empirical study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) has pointed out
the relevance of such ”too” complete contracts. They ﬁnd that CEO pay is as sensitive
to purely random variations of realized proﬁt as to variations of proﬁt that are due
to the CEO’s eﬀort.
5 Conclusion
Introducing inequity aversion yields results that deviate from those known from the
standard principal agent literature. If the principal can condition on the eﬀort level,
the optimal contract for the case of a risk neutral agent is unique and implies an
equitable sharing rule. Also the unique Second Best contract in the limit of strong
inequity aversion speciﬁes an equitable sharing rule. Therefore we have a strong ten-
dency towards linearity in the incentive schemes. In contrast to the standard principal
agent literature, which focuses on the incentive constraint as the reason for contin-
gent contracts, here it is the participation constraint, too, which causes a contract to
depend on the outcome in a linear form.
Furthermore we show that even for risk neutral agents the First Best is in general
not implementable as soon as eﬀort is no longer observable. It is also shown that
under inequity aversion the suﬃcient statistics result no longer holds, as the optimal
contract conditions on the realized proﬁt level even if proﬁt is not a suﬃcient statistic
for the eﬀort choice.
There are several ways in which the model could be extended. One might explore
the extent to which introducing inequity aversion on the principal’s side will alter the
results. This may be an additional driving force towards linear contracts, specifying
an equitable sharing rule, as now both parties have a preference for equitable distri-
butions. Therefore this should even strengthen our results. A logical next step is an
application of this approach to team production problems and multi agent problems
as inequity aversion should be even more important when agents have to interact
with peers.
Summing up, assuming inequity averse preferences on the agent’s side sheds someContracts and Inequity Aversion 14
light on topics in contract theory which have not yet been satisfactorily resolved. Our
basic claim seems rather robust. Introducing inequity aversion in the utility function
adds a driving force towards linear contracts. This provides a very simple, plausible
and experimentally well supported explanation for the predominance of linear wage
schemes in real labor markets.Contracts and Inequity Aversion 15
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The First Order Condition of the First Best problem yields after rearranging
G
0(·) =
1 − λ
2αλ
= constant
=⇒ x − 2w(x) = constant ≡ γ
=⇒ w(x) = γ +
1
2
x
Given that G0(·) is constant for all x it follows by the strict convexity of G that the
level of inequity over all realisations of x is constant, i.e. an equitable sharing rule is
optimal.
q.e.d.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
First one has to note that here - in contrast to standard principal agent models - the
optimal First Best contract is unique. The Lagrangian of the First Best Problem has
the form
L = E[UP(x − w(x))|e] − λ[¯ UA − E[UA
 
e]]
The derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to eﬀort yields
∂L
∂e
=
∂ E[UP(x − w(x))|e]
∂e
+ λ
∂ E[UA|e]
∂e
= 0
The second expression is the derivative of the agent’s incentive constraint and there-
fore has to be zero in optimum in the Second Best case. If we plug in the First Best
wage scheme, which according to Proposition 1 has the form w∗(x) = γ + 1/2x, the
term
∂ E[UP(x−w(x))|e]
∂e changes to 1/2
∂E[x|e]
∂e , which has to be zero in order to guarantee
the First Best solution if the Incentive Constraint holds in the Second Best. But, asContracts and Inequity Aversion 16
we assumed c(e) > 0, it can not be an equilibrium if
∂E[x|e]
∂e
 

e=eFB is equal to zero, as
we could reduce the eﬀort, and hence c(e) without reducing the expected value of x.
Therefore
∂ E[UA|e]
∂e 6= 0 must hold, which means that the First Best eﬀort level is not
implementable in the Second Best.
q.e.d.
6.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Diﬀerentiating the Lagrangian of the Second Best problem with respect to w(x) yields
after rearranging this condition for G0(·).
G
0(·) =
1
2α

 1
λ + µ
fe(x|e)
f(x|e)
− 1


Diﬀerentiating this equation with rerspect to x gives us the following condition for
w0(·)
w
0(x) =
1
2
+
1
α
µ ∂
∂x
h
fe(x|e)
f(x|e)
i
4
h
λ + µ
fe(x|e)
f(x|e)
i2
G00(·)
where ∂
∂x
h
fe(x|e)
f(x|e)
i
denotes the derivative of the Likelihood Ratio with respect to x,
which has to be positive if the MLRP holds. Therefore the slope of the incentive
scheme has to be strictly above 1/2, as the second term is strictly positive.
q.e.d.
6.4 Proof of Lemma 2
The ﬁrst derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to w(x) gives after rearranging
u
0
A[w(x)] = −2αG
0(·) + 1/λ
Diﬀerentiating the whole expression with respect to x yields
w
0(x) =
1
2
+
u00
A[w(x)]
α8G00(·) − 2u00
A[w(x)]
As the latter part is stricly smaller than zero the slope is strictly below 1/2. q.e.d.Contracts and Inequity Aversion 17
6.5 Proof of Lemma 3
Diﬀerentiating the First Order Condition with respect to x gives us the following
condition for w0(x)



+
z }| {
−u
00
A +
+
z }| {
4αG
00


w
0(x) =


 

 

 


+
z }| {
2αG
00 +
+
z }| {
µ
∂
∂x
"
fe(x | e)
f(x | e)
#
"
λ + µ
fe(x | e)
f(x | e)
#2
| {z }
+


 

 

 
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From this expression one can see fairly easy that w0(x) has to be positive in order to
guarantee this equation to hold.
q.e.d.
6.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose the ﬁrms’ proﬁt Π can be separated into two parts x and y, i.e. Π = x + y.
While the distribution f(x | e) of x depends on the eﬀort e exerted by the agent,
y is purely randomly distributed and its density is given by g(y). To show that the
suﬃcient statistics result does not apply when the agent exhibits inequity aversion
consider the principal’s optimisation problem
max EUP =
¯ x Z
x
f(x | e)xdx +
¯ y Z
y
g(y)ydy −
¯ x Z
x
¯ y Z
y
w(x,y)f(x | e)g(y)dxdy
s.t.(PC) ¯ U ≤
¯ x Z
x
¯ y Z
y
{u[w(x,y)] − αG[x + y − 2w(x,y)]}f(x | e)g(y)dxdy − c(e)
s.t.(IC) e ∈ argmax
e
¯ x Z
x
¯ y Z
y
{u[w(x,y)] − αG[x + y − 2w(x,y)]}f(x | e)g(y)dxdy − c(e)
where g(y) is the density function for y, the random part of the proﬁt. By using the
ﬁrst order approach one gets
(IC0) 0 =
¯ x R
x
¯ y R
y
fe(x | e)g(y)[u[w(x,y) − αG[x + y − 2w(x,y)]]dxdy − ce(e)Contracts and Inequity Aversion 18
The ﬁrst order condition for the principal’s optimization problem has the following
form
0 = −1 + λ[u
0[w(x,y)] + 2αG
0[·]] + µ
fe(x,y | e)
f(x,y | e)
[u
0[w(x,y)] + 2αG
0[·]]
An application of the implicit function theorem yields
∂w
∂y
=
αG00[·]
4αG00[·] − u00[w(x,y)]
6= 0 ∀ α 6= 0
As w depends on y, which does not contain any information about the agent’s eﬀort
choice the suﬃcient statistics result does not apply .15
q.e.d.
15Not surprisingly, for α = 0, i.e. a purely selﬁsh agent, the suﬃcient statistics result applies again,
as there wy(y) = 0 holds.Contracts and Inequity Aversion 19
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